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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to better understand the challenges of 
avoiding the dark side of technological innovation. Specifically, we 
analyse 10 public investigations started as a reaction to a major 
crisis in regenerative medicine at the Karolinska Institute, Sweden, 
associated with the clinician-scientist Paolo Macchiarini. We inter-
pret the reaction as an attempt to restore the balance between the 
stimulation and regulation of technological innovation processes 
by clarifying ambiguities in the regulation at the interface between 
research and practice. We conceptualise these ambiguities as grey 
zones – situations when it is unclear if the benefits of experimenta-
tion outweigh its risks – and propose that grey zones are continu-
ally created and resolved as actors in innovation governance 









Technological innovation has both positive and negative impacts upon society (Stirling 
2017). While the negative impacts are in this special issue referred to as the dark side of 
innovation one might (with implicit reference to the movie Star Wars) refer to the 
positive impacts as its light side. The new knowledge generated as outcomes of scientific, 
technological and innovation processes can lead to great benefits for society – such as 
increasing living standards through improved food safety or new medical procedures – 
but the process itself, which is inherently a process involving trial-and-error, may expose 
people, or the environment, to undue risks or even harm (Moreno 2001). The purpose of 
this article is to better understand the challenges of avoiding the dark side of technolo-
gical innovation. We explore how actors in the innovation governance system counter-
balance the stimulation of novelty for future benefits for society with the regulation of 
novelty, in order to avoid the risk of unintended consequences.
Let us first consider why this issue matters, when we consider the relationship between 
public policy and innovation governance. The rationale for public policy makers to spend 
money to stimulate science, technology and innovation is the expectation of future 
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positive effects, such as improving living standards or solving societal challenges 
(Mazzucato 2018). In this positive view, society benefits from science and technology 
in the long-run through the introduction of new products like the iPhone, new services 
like microloans, new clinical practice to cure malaria, and new organisational forms to 
bring ideas to market through entrepreneurship. Specifically, the type of public policy 
that we are interested in here relates to science, technology and innovation, often known 
as innovation policy (Borrás and Edquist 2019). Following previous research, innovation 
policy is here defined as public policy intended to stimulate the creation and use of new 
scientific and technical knowledge, due to its potential future benefits for society, by 
promoting collaboration among multiple actors involved in developing science, technol-
ogy and innovation, such as universities, research institutes, industrial firms, and user 
communities (Edler and Fagerberg 2017). Contributions also analyse how collaboration 
occurs, when the development of science, technology and innovation relies upon diverse 
types of actors, which each have their own aims and incentives for participation 
(McKelvey, Zaring, and Szücs 2019). The broader concept of innovation governance is 
used to denote how these different types of actors, together with public regulatory 
authorities, shape how innovations are produced, introduced, and diffused by collectively 
regulating issues of societal concern (Borrás and Edler 2014). As the stimulation of 
science, technology, and innovation are issues of societal concern, especially for medical 
innovation (McKelvey, Saemundsson, and Zaring 2018), we explicitly include it as a part 
of innovation governance.
We have chosen to study a major crisis within medicine, more specifically in 
regenerative medicine in Sweden. The crisis, associated with the clinician-scientist 
Paolo Macchiarini, played out at the prestigious Karolinska Institute – the home to 
the Nobel Prize in Medicine – and sparked a public outcry due to the belief that the 
involved clinician-scientists had overstepped ethical boundaries in their search for 
novel treatments. We consider the crisis as a focusing device that we use to analyse 
the dynamics of innovation governance more generally. Crises within science, tech-
nology and innovation tend to lead to public concerns about the negative effects and 
associated risks of innovation, which in turn promote additional demands for more 
inclusive, responsible and transparent innovation processes (Stilgoe, Owen, and 
MacNaghten 2013). Hence, the empirical study enables us to analyse the delibera-
tions and reactions of actors in an innovation governance system that find them-
selves needing to respond to negative unintended consequences of a strong 
stimulation for research excellence and major industrial impact. We propose an 
extension of the concept of grey zones – which we define as situations when it is 
unclear if the benefits of experimentation outweigh its risks. We also propose that 
grey zones are continually created and resolved as innovation governance systems 
counterbalance the generation of novelty and the risk of negative unintended 
consequences.
2. Conceptual framework
This section discusses and defines relevant concepts and relationships for the conceptual 
framework guiding our study, which is based on three components, namely: 
a conceptualisation of innovation governance; an evolutionary perspective on the 
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generation and use of new scientific and technical knowledge; and the empirical setting of 
medical innovation. At the end, we visualise our framework.
Our first component is a definition of innovation governance. From a broad inter-
disciplinary perspective, Borrás and Edler (2014) define innovation governance as how 
actors involved in the development of science, technology and innovation collectively 
regulate issues of societal concern by shaping how innovations are produced, intro-
duced, and diffused in society. Thus, one starting point here is that the innovation 
governance system has two purposes, namely to stimulate and to regulate innovation 
processes.
Innovation researchers have long held that innovation is an uncertain and complex 
process because it relies upon mutual interactions and knowledge flows across private 
actors like firms, societal actors like universities, non-profit organisations and profes-
sional societies, as well as public actors like government agencies (Fagerberg, Mowery, 
and Nelson 2005). From this stream of literature, we extract the broad notion that actors 
involved in innovation governance attempt to both stimulate and regulate the generation 
and use of scientific and technical knowledge useful for innovation. We also note that 
innovation governance is complex, in the sense that a wide variety of actors are involved, 
each with their different aims and different ideas of which issues are of societal concern. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty about the outcomes of innovation processes – especially if 
they are related to emerging science and technology – require some forms of tentative 
governance that is revised as new knowledge becomes available, e.g. about negative 
unintended consequences (Kuhlmann, Stegmaier, and Konrad 2019).
Therefore, in this paper, we define innovation governance as a dynamic, systemic, 
multi-level process involving diverse sets of actors – which may be directly engaged in, or 
external to, the innovation process – and which are concerned with the stimulation and 
regulation of innovation. This builds upon McKelvey, Zaring, and Szücs (2019), which 
articulates the collective action and public resource pools as well as monitoring problems 
in the development of science and technology involving multiple actors. Analysing the 
institutions and monitoring aspects of the innovation governance system is important, 
because both the public sector and the private sector are investing money into research 
and development for science and technology. The public sector wants new knowledge 
which can be diffused widely and improve society, whereas the private sector is primarily 
concerned with developing and using such knowledge to generate profits through 
innovations. This perspective has been applied to medical research and innovation 
specifically. McKelvey, Saemundsson, and Zaring (2018) define in more detail what 
constitutes collective action at the intersection between medical research and clinical 
practice. They argue collective action for medical research is particularly difficult to 
regulate because it usually takes place in collaboration between universities, university 
hospitals, and industrial firms. Moreover, they propose a distinction between self- 
regulation by the actors involved in medical research and clinical practice as compared 
to external regulation by government agencies and similar.
Therefore, we follow a definition from McKelvey, Zaring, and Szücs (2019) and also 
used for medical innovation in McKelvey, Saemundsson, and Zaring (2018). Here, we 
conceptualise that collective action and public resource pools are created jointly by public 
and private actors. Furthermore, these diverse actors develop norms, incentives and 
institutions, to support the interaction required for the collective action to be successful 
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and which also helps monitoring and regulating undesirable behaviour not conforming 
to the common interests of the actors involved.
Summarising our first component, we define innovation governance as attempts by 
diverse set of actors to stimulate and regulate the generation and use of new knowledge 
involved in science, technology and innovation processes. Thus, we see innovation 
governance as involving two separate goals, namely on the one hand stimulating science, 
technology and innovation as collective action due to the expected future benefits and, on 
the other hand, the regulation of the collective action process to avoid undesirable 
behaviour. Furthermore, we acknowledge the tentative and dynamic nature of innova-
tion governance, especially in the context of emerging science and technology.
Our second component is an evolutionary theoretical perspective applied to the 
generation and use of new scientific and technical knowledge. At the most general 
level, an evolutionary perspective for social sciences is concerned with how the char-
acteristics of entities evolve as the entities adapt to their environment, and usually 
involves a framework specifying the generation of variety, selection processes and the 
retention of elements selected (Campbell 1987; Nelson and Winter 1982). In relation to 
our topic of scientific and technical knowledge useful for innovation, we draw upon 
a stream of literature that has connected the evolutionary process of variety generation 
and selective retention to the process of problem solving (Consoli et al. 2016; Kline and 
Rosenberg 1986; Thomke, von Hippel, and Franke 1998; Vincenti 1990). Central to this 
perspective is the idea that innovations based on new scientific and technical knowledge 
derive from an inherently uncertain process of problem-solving, i.e. a series of repeated 
trials of potential solutions to a given problem. Such repeated trials lead to results which 
are used, in combination with insights about where possible solutions are to be found, in 
order to revise or refine the solutions, and the process continues until an acceptable result 
is reached. Thus, even if the process is uncertain the generation of variety is not blind as 
conceptualised in Darwinian evolution but rather Lamarckian as it is guided by insights 
by people as to where possible solutions are to be found (Hodgson 2015; McKelvey 1996).
But where do the insights come from that guide the actors involved in these repeated 
trials for possible solutions and generate variety? A first aspect to consider is the relation-
ship to theory and practice. Following Fleming and Sorenson (2004) we propose that 
there are two major classes of insights that guide the search for possible solutions. First, 
there are theory-driven insights based on generalisable scientific knowledge, which 
provides the equivalence of a map that predicts the feasibility and efficacy of particular 
set of solutions. With the help of the map, the actors can engage in search for possible 
solutions, which can be directed towards the most promising parts of the map. Second, 
there are experience-driven insights based on previous experience. This includes experi-
ence from solving similar problems where the search proceeds in incremental steps and 
the feasibility and efficacy of the direction taken are difficult to predict in advance. 
A second aspect in the literature is that theory and practice may involve different 
epistemological communities. In this view, there is a distance between research as 
science, and practice as technology. The former focuses on the creation and validation 
of generalisable knowledge and the latter focuses more upon solving specific practical 
problems (Nightingale 1998, 2004). Thus, the implications are that bridging research and 
practice requires the combined insights from theory-driven search (informed by science) 
and experience-driven search (informed by practice).
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In order to combine theory-driven and experience-driven problem-solving processes 
in our conceptual framework, we rely on one specific contribution which conceptualises 
problem-solving as engineering design (Vincenti 1990). Engineering design may be 
informed by science (theory-driven), but is also heavily dependent on practice (experi-
ence-driven). Furthermore, Vincenti (1990) argues that in engineering design, different 
means are used for testing and selecting the variety that is generated. On one hand, direct 
trials in real-world settings are used, e.g. flying in a full-sized prototype airplane. On the 
other hand, indirect trials are used where the complexity of real-world settings is reduced, 
e.g. by using a simplified, or a virtual, version of the test object (miniature airplane in 
a wind tunnel) or by decomposing the original problem into more controllable sub- 
problems (testing full-size wings in a wind tunnel). Simplified or virtual solutions provide 
an incomplete and indirect way of interacting with reality but reduce the number of 
possible solutions that need to be tried under real-world settings, which are less con-
trolled and where failure tends to have more dire consequences (Campbell 1987; 
Thomke, von Hippel, and Franke 1998; Vincenti 1990).
Thus, for this second component, we propose that the generation and use of new 
scientific and technical knowledge – which is the subject of innovation governance – is 
conceptualised as an evolutionary problem-solving process operating at the intersection 
between research and practice. We mean that at this intersection – where there is true 
uncertainty about future outcomes – the generation of variety is guided by a combination 
of theory-driven and experience-driven insights with the selection of variety through 
both direct or indirect trials. Our interpretation is that because direct trials tend to be less 
controlled, and take place in existing systems of practice, they usually pose larger risks of 
negative unintended consequences as compared to indirect trials.
Our third component relates the two components above to the empirical setting of 
medical innovation. Here, we can follow extant literature on medical innovation, which 
provides an evolutionary perspective on the generation and use of scientific and technical 
knowledge. Specifically, this literature stresses how and why medical research and clinical 
practices operate as separate, but co-evolving, epistemic communities that, taken 
together, shape the growth of knowledge of medical technologies and their use in clinical 
practice (Consoli and Mina 2009; Gelijns and Rosenberg 1994; Metcalfe, James, and Mina 
2005; Morlacchi and Nelson 2011; Rosenberg 2009). Thus, equivalent to the distance 
between science and technology in the general innovation studies literature, the medical 
innovation literature has identified the epistemological distance between medical 
research and clinical practice. Moreover, the above distinction we made between direct 
and indirect trials is especially salient for medical innovation because direct trials, such as 
clinical trials, involve humans while indirect trials do not.
Specifically, this medical innovation literature has what we consider three main 
approaches to studying how the epistemological distance between medical research and 
clinical practice may be bridged. One stream of literature stresses that bridging occurs at 
the organisation level, specifically hospitals. This literature emphasises the centrality of 
hospitals in medical innovation – generally with a positive effect on innovation – where 
innovations include a wide range of new medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and clinical 
procedures (Hopkins 2006; Lander and Atkinson-Grosjean 2011; Thune and Mina 2016). 
Another stream of literature stresses that bridging occurs at the individual level of the 
scientist-clinician. This literature focuses upon the role of clinician-scientists, that are 
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jointly employed by hospitals and universities, and argue that these individuals help 
solves a perceived paradox of modern biomedicine, namely the limited impact that the 
molecular revolution has had on clinical practice (Lenfant 2003; Vignola-Gagné, 
Biegelbauer, and Lehner 2014). Finally, a third category of literature stresses the impor-
tance of clinical research as a set of activities. This literature is concerned that the 
prominence of theory-driven research in molecular biology and molecular genetics has 
led to a reduced emphasis on clinical research, which is more experience-driven and 
better connected to medical practice (Ahrens 1992; Gittelman 2016; Hirsch 1997). We 
combine the three approaches.
Thus, for this third component, we stress the importance of clinical research. We 
conceptualise that medical research and clinical practices operate as separate, but co- 
evolving, epistemic communities involved in the generation and use of new scientific and 
technical knowledge for medical innovation. These communities are bridged by clin-
ician-scientists conducting clinical research in hospitals. Our rationale follows. The 
important role that hospitals play within science, technology and innovation processes 
is directly related to their organisational role as the venue for clinical research involving 
patients (direct trials). Such clinical research is performed by clinician-scientists, who 
may complement their research on patients in hospitals with laboratory research outside 
the hospital that involves computer simulations, animal models and cell systems instead 
of patients (indirect trials). Thus, we specify that individual clinician-scientists, through 
their joint appointment at a university and a hospital, are part of a collective action 
including both organisations. Through clinical research activities, the individual and 
organisational level meet in an attempt to generate and use new knowledge by bridging 
the epistemological communities of medical research and clinical practice in the context 
of the hospital and involving patients.
Taken together, we combine these three components into our conceptual framework, 
visualised in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Conceptual framework guiding the study of the reaction to a recent crisis in regenerative 
medicine.
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As shown in Figure 1, this paper is concerned with innovation governance for clinical 
research. We have defined clinical research narrowly, as the generation and use of new 
knowledge by clinician-scientists in the context of the hospital and involving patients. 
We conceptualise clinical research as related to both medical research and clinical 
practice, as shown by the overlap of the two circles. Therefore, the process of clinical 
research is seen as an evolutionary problem-solving process, where the generation of 
variety can be guided by theory-driven or experience-driven insights, but where selection 
is done through direct trials. This is regulated by the wider innovation governance 
system, which consists of policy makers, regulatory agencies, universities, hospitals and 
medical research peers. Innovation governance can include both the stimulation and 
regulation of clinical research activities, as represented by the two arrows in the middle. 
Furthermore, we propose that negative unintended consequences are not fully dealt with 
by existing regulation, which means that the system needs to react to them when they 
occur as represented by the arrow at bottom of the Figure.
3. Methodology
Our research design is a longitudinal single case study of a crisis related to innovation 
governance. We chose a single case study design because the selected case is both extreme 
and complex (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 1994). The case study chosen is extreme with regards 
to the magnitude of the reaction by the innovation governance system and provides 
a unique opportunity (as compared to other country and time-points) to analyse what 
each relevant actor specifies they consider as normal and deviant behaviour, what is 
contested, as well as what regulatory changes they propose. Furthermore, the case 
involves a complex system of governance and provides unusually rich information, 
which we analyse in relation to our objectives.
At the time of writing, there are two existing publications in our field which provide 
detailed, but different, information about other aspects of the Macchiarini crisis. 
Berggren and Karabag (2019) focus upon scientific misconduct – also known as fraud 
and dishonesty – using theories from organisational theory about institutional complex-
ity. They develop a perspective of three types of competing logics (market-oriented, 
medical, and academic) of institutional fields, and do not address innovation governance, 
other than mentioning fragmented control. McKelvey, Saemundsson, and Zaring (2018) 
describe the historical development of the Macchiarini crisis, and explicitly analyse the 
complex interactions between different organisations using the theoretical lens of inno-
vation governance. They do so in order identify challenges for public policy, balancing 
between scientific excellence, translational research, and opportunities for scientific 
misconduct. In contrast to this paper, McKelvey, Saemundsson, and Zaring (2018) do 
not address our focus on the interface between scientific research and clinical practice 
nor they do not consider reactions to the crisis. Two additional papers do discuss limited 
issues related to the intersection (Arnason 2019; Sethi 2019). Therefore, the novelty in the 
current article is that we provide a more detailed understanding of this intersection 
between medical research and clinical practice, which is extremely important for medical 
innovation but poorly conceptualised in relation to innovation governance.
In this article, the official investigations form the basis of our analysis. Ten public 
investigations were carried out, leading to 10 lengthy reports that represent the 
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perspective of each actor in the innovation governance system. Under the Swedish public 
information law, all official investigations and material at authorities must be made 
available upon request, and many are posted on websites. While a few things are in 
English, the documents are primarily in Swedish, a language that both authors master 
and so translations below are done by the authors. We explicitly chose not to conduct 
interviews, partly due to the contested nature of the case, and partly due to the extensive 
nature of the written documentation.
We have gathered data during four years through an iterative process, with two 
separate steps of data gathering, also in relation to theoretical development.
The first step of the data collection began in January 2016, when both authors watched 
the TV documentary, which sparked a wider public interest in the scandal emerging 
around the clinician-scientist Pablo Macchiarini and the Karolinska Institute (KI). The 
authors immediately agreed to develop a joint IT-based retrieval system to systematically 
gather all documentation from 2010 to end of 2016 from: the university (Karolinska 
Institute, KI); the university hospital (Karolinska University Hospital, KuH), main 
research financiers (Swedish Research Council, Swedish Heart and Lung Fund); 
Retraction Watch; scientific journal articles mentioned in relation to accusations of 
scientific misconduct; influential national newspapers and magazines; as well as down-
loaded copies of websites from this group (due to the possibility they would be shut 
down). Based on this material, the authors jointly wrote up a thorough empirical 
description of the case, with approximately 100 pages of detailed description of the 
main events ordered chronologically. Based upon this chronological case, McKelvey, 
Saemundsson, and Zaring (2018) was published, constituting a detailed descriptive case 
on much more limited material than the current paper, as well as a different goal. Later, 
up until January 2019, we continued to gather press releases, articles in professional 
magazines and the popular press, and blog entries, which provided information about the 
10 official investigations.
The second step of data collection for this paper specifically was to gather all official 
investigations (10) and related statements, which we have categorised as reactions to the 
crisis. As specified in the Appendix, the material from the investigations, reports and 
statements, consists of more than 1,000 pages of text. This documentation represents 
detailed information, and an unusually rich opportunity to map the perspectives. Each of 
these documents has slightly different foci, but all address the interface of scientific 
research and clinical practice. One author read all documentation, hand-coded, and 
categorised their statements as to 1) what activities they considered to constitute clinical 
research, i.e. generation and use of new scientific and technical knowledge at the inter-
section between medical research and clinical practice, 2) their investigation as to what 
went wrong, e.g. the negative unintended consequences, and, 3) their proposed regula-
tory improvements to avoid similar crises in the future. Both authors discussed the 
results and appropriate categories of analysis.
Through this critical reading of the sources, we reconstructed the sequence of events – 
and the involvement of each of the actors. We thereafter derived three phases relative to 
theory, which we call the stimulation of innovation, the generation of negative unin-
tended consequences, and reaction by innovation governance actors, which we used to 
structure the presentation of the case study. Moreover, as an outcome, we categorise the 
activities constituting clinical research into three conceptual categories as search for new 
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knowledge, search for new solutions, and support for new solutions. Finally, one author 
wrote up the initial analysis, and then new weekly versions were then jointly discussed by 
both authors, through weekly meetings over 18 months, and both authors engaged in 
revisions of the manuscript.
There are many limitations to our research design of a single case study, chosen as 
extreme for theoretical reasons. We do not claim that the case is representative nor valid 
across countries, nor even within Sweden over time. However, we have chosen it as an 
extreme case for theoretical sampling, as it provides new insights into the dynamics of 
innovation governance at the interface between medical research and clinical practice.
Although not the focus here, we acknowledge that there is a wider interest in the topic 
of fraud and inappropriate scientific conduct across fields of research (Hall and Martin 
2019). The literature describes many similar crises related to scientific misconduct within 
regenerative medicine specifically (Cyranoski 2012; Kim and Park 2013; Bik, Cadadevall, 
and Fang 2016; Adam. 2019). Moreover, we acknowledge the expanding stream of 
research which addresses scientific misconduct – such as fraud, falsification, dishonesty, 
retraction, inappropriate image duplication and other dubious academic practices.
4. Results
We present and analyse our case study in two parts below. First, using categories we 
found in our case study, we briefly describe the crisis and summarise it as three phases: 
stimulation, unintended consequences, and reaction. Second, we specifically analyse the 
reaction of the innovation governance actors to the negative unintended consequences of 
the crisis, by focusing on the regulation of the interface between medical research and 
clinical practice.
4.1. The three phases of the crisis
Figure 2 gives an overview of the sequence of events (2008–2016) leading up to the crisis 
and the actions of the actors of involved with the governance of medical innovation, the 
Figure 2. Overview of the sequence of events leading to the Macchiarini crisis and actions of actors 
involved in the governance of medical innovation.
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Government, the Karolinska Institute (KI), the Karolinska University Hospital (KUH), 
and research peers.
The origin of the crisis can be found in a very large public policy initiative to promote 
excellent science. When presenting their annual research bill in 2008, the Swedish 
government initiated a new funding for selected Strategic Research Areas (SRA). The 
objective of this initiative was to increase international competitiveness of Swedish 
industries as well as to produce the highest international excellence in science (Swedish 
Executive Government 2008). For the total SRA policy initiative, the government 
invested a total of 590 million EUR between 2010 and 2014 (Swedish Research Council 
2015).
In 2010–2014 the Karolinska Institute (KI) received money from the SRA initiative – 
one of seven SRA grants obtained by KI – for a ‘strategic research program in Stem Cell 
Research and Regenerative Medicine’ that ‘supports research that advances our under-
standing of stem cell biology and approaches to bring regenerative medicine to the clinic, 
for future treatment of diseases for which there currently are no therapies’ (StratRegen 
2016). We estimate that during the period 2010–2014, the KI research programme 
received a total of around 15,5 million EUR. Furthermore, KI used the SRA program 
as a platform to obtain a number of additional large grants in regenerative medicine from 
various other sources – mostly public ones but also foundations – in order to establish 
and support a number of research centres in the area. In total, we estimate that KI 
obtained and spent between 33 and 50 million EUR on regenerative medicine between 
2010 and 2014.
As a way to realise the KI ambition to achieve the highest international excellence in 
regenerative medicine, KI recruited the clinician-scientist Paolo Macchiarini in 2010 and 
also established the Advanced Centre of Translational Regenerative Medicine 
(ACTERM) research centre for him to lead. One reason for recruiting him was that 
Macchiarini and his colleagues had carried out a human trachea transplant operation in 
2008 using stem cells and a biological implant. Their operation was novel, and widely 
Figure 3. Specification of clinical research activities.
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acclaimed as revolutionary for the field of regenerative medicine (Vogel 2013). KI hired 
him with the expectation that he would improve his method for airway transplants and 
‘adapt the procedure to other intrathoracic organs of increasingly complex architecture’ 
(Karolinska Institute 2016). Through the influence of KI on the Karolinska University 
Hospital (KUH), Macchiarini was also jointly employed by the hospital. KUH empha-
sised that his primary role was to conduct translational research bridging medical 
research and clinical practice.
In 2011, Macchiarini and colleagues at KUH performed the first of its kind stem cell- 
based trachea implant using a synthetic scaffold made of polymers. One more operation 
followed later the same year and another a year later. In later public investigations, it was 
determined that the group had not followed the formal procedures for ethical approval of 
research studies for any of these operations. Nor did they follow the formal procedures 
for the approval of the use of pharmaceuticals for advanced therapy, which was required 
because the trachea scaffold was seeded with stem cells. The reason given for not 
obtaining the appropriate formal procedures was as follows. Through informal contact 
with regulatory agencies and internal conferences at KUH, the clinical managers made 
the judgement that the decision to operate could be based on the patient’s critical 
condition and on the lack of alternatives, and therefore did not require formal regulatory 
approval (Asplund 2016). However, the operation was used for medical research. Despite 
not obtaining permission for a research study, the authors later wrote up the operation of 
the first patient as the subject of a research publication (Jungebluth et al. 2011). 
Moreover, KI reported the results to the government, and specified that it considered 
these operations to be highly successful and also an outcome of the KI regenerative 
research program (Swedish Research Council 2012). Later investigations showed that the 
involved physicians did not follow professional guidelines, such as the Helsinki declara-
tion on ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects. This declaration 
states that even if unproven interventions may be used in the hope of ‘saving life, re- 
establishing health or alleviating suffering’ they should not be repeated, or if done 
subsequently, where possible, be made the object of research (WMA 2008). Therefore, 
according to these guidelines, at least the two latter operations should have been a part of 
an approved research project.
In parallel, scientific misconduct was quickly alleged. The operations for the trachea 
implants were initially hailed and reported in journal articles as very successful. However, 
some research peers argued that it was impossible that the implants were working as well 
as reported in the 2011 paper. Several things happened in relation to these allegations. 
Macchiarini’s contract with KUH was not renewed in 2013, despite pressures from KI to 
continue the joint appointment (Asplund 2016). Moreover, in 2014 four physicians 
jointly employed by KI and KUH filed a formal complaint about scientific misconduct 
at KI, suggesting that scientific papers authored by Macchiarini had incorrectly described 
the benefits of the implants. In 2014 a Belgian professor also filed a formal complaint to 
KI accusing Macchiarini for scientific misconduct. Following an internal and external 
investigation of the allegations – as required by university regulation – KI freed 
Macchiarini of scientific misconduct in 2015 (Hamsten and Samuelsson 2015a, 2015b). 
At this point, the internal university decision to clear his name was taken, despite the fact 
that the external examiner (Gerdin 2015) had been very critical in his report.
INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION 89
In early 2016 the Swedish public television (SVT) aired a three-hour documentary 
called ‘The Experiments’ (Experimenten), filmed by Bo Lindquist (2016). The documen-
tary followed Macchiarini over several years as he implanted synthetic tracheas at KUH 
and in Russia, and presents information that suggested that the operations lacked proper 
scientific support and regulatory approval. Furthermore, it showed leaders of the pres-
tigious KI defending the clinician-scientist’s conduct despite mounting evidence of its 
inappropriateness. A public outcry followed in Swedish media. After initially supporting 
him, and following various resignations from prestigious posts, KI finally decided to 
relieve Macchiarini of his duties and close down the ACTREM centre. These interlinked 
events initiated a series of 10 public investigations (see Appendix for a complete list) to 
restore confidence in the governance of medical research and innovation in clinical 
practice.
Based on our analysis we summarise the crisis as three phases of stimulation, negative 
unintended consequences, and reaction, as seen in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the details for each actor in the innovation governance system. The first 
phase is characterised by the stimulus from the major funding of regenerative medicine 
in Sweden, which is initiated and led by the government, and high expectation of the 
clinical value of regenerative medicine in general and Macchiarini’s research in particu-
lar. The second phase is characterised by the emergence of the negative unintended 
consequences of the stimulus. These appear as the execution of an unsuccessful high-risk 
clinical procedure that was made possible by scientific misconduct and the bypassing of 
regulatory procedures and ethical guidelines, and further amplified by inappropriate 
handling of allegations of misconduct. Finally, the third phase is characterised by the 
reactions of the actors involved in the governance of medical innovation, once the TV 
documentary had resulted in a public outcry. In the next section, we analyse these 
reactions in more detail with a focus on the regulation of the interface between medical 
research and clinical practice.
4.2. Reacting to negative unintended consequences
To regain public confidence in the governance of medical innovation, official investiga-
tions were initiated that focused on what had happened, why it had happened, and how it 
could be avoided in the future. Our focus is on the intersection between medical research 
and clinical practice, i.e. clinical research, which we have defined as the generation and 
Table 1. The Macchiarini crisis summarised as three phases of stimulation, unintended negative 
consequences, and reactions and how each phase relates to the actors in the innovation governance.
Actor Stimulation Unintended negative consequences Reaction




Research centre. Inappropriate recruitment process Influence on KUH. 





KI influence. New high-risk clinical practice. Investigation 
(3)
Peers First biological 
trachea 
implant.
Bypassing of ethical guidelines. Investigation 
(5)
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use of new knowledge by clinical-scientists in the context of the hospital and involving 
patients. Thus, we focus on how – in the investigations – the activities constituting 
clinical research were defined, how they were supposed to be regulated according to 
existing regulation, and what changes were suggested to avoid similar crises in the future.
Most of the investigation reports refer to the same sources when defining what 
activities constitute clinical research. On one hand, they refer to the Health and 
Medical Services Act (Hälso- and sjukvårdslagen) and the Patient Safety Act 
(Patientsäkerhetslagen) for defining clinical practice and its relationship to science. On 
the other hand, they refer to the Ethical Review Act (Etikprövningslagen) when defining 
research. Furthermore, they relate these concepts to other concepts used by the medical 
profession. Some of these concepts are concerned with activities performed by clinicians 
and scientists, but others are concerned with exceptions, i.e. situations under which 
standard regulations do not apply (Table 2).
According to Swedish law and regulation, clinical practice is defined as medical 
measures – based on science and confirmed experience (‘vetenskap och beprövad 
erfarenhet’) – that are used to prevent, diagnose and treat diseases and injuries 
(Asplund 2016; Gerdin 2015; Heckscher, Carlberg, and Gahmberg 2016; Lindvall and 
Engström 2016; SMER 2016; SOU 2017). The concept of confirmed experience is not 
defined in the law nor is it an internationally established concept. Thus, many of the 
reports discuss the boundaries of confirmed experience in order to identify the bound-
aries between clinical practice and medical research.
Lindvall and Engström (2016), who wrote a report on behalf of The Swedish Society of 
Medicine and the Royal Academy of Sciences, use the concept of non-confirmed treat-
ment (‘obeprövade behandlingsmetoder’) and medical innovation for measures that 
physicians historically have used to treat seriously ill patients, which, despite being 
often based on science, cannot be seen as confirmed by experience. These measures 
may be early in their development or may have been used for other patient groups or 
indications. The rationale for using these measures in clinical practice has been the 
seriousness of the illness and the lack of alternative treatment options. Similarly, SMER 
(2016) defines innovative therapy as a clinical procedure that is being used without its 
benefits and risks being evaluated in clinical trials and whose efficacy has not been 
confirmed by experience. Innovative therapy, or non-confirmed treatment, are men-
tioned in most of the reports, usually with a reference to the Helsinki declaration and 
guidelines by the International Society for Stem Cell Research for the existence and 
justification of such procedures.
Table 2. Concepts used by the medical profession and Swedish law and regulations, as reported by 
investigation reports in the wake of the Macchiarini crisis, to define activities at the intersection 
between medical research and clinical practice.
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The exceptions are usually reviewed in the investigation reports as possible justification 
for the use of non-confirmed treatment or innovative therapy. The hospital exception and 
the compassionate use program are specifically concerned with the possibility to produce 
and use pharmaceuticals that are still in development and both require approval from the 
Medical Products Agency. Vital indication and compassionate use are ethical principles 
justifying the use of unusual measures in urgent situations (vital indication) or when no 
other known alternatives exist (compassionate use). However, according to Asplund 
(2016), these principles cannot be used in order to bypass regulation.
The concept of clinical trials is defined in Swedish law and regulation as concerned 
with a clinical investigation of the effects of the use of a pharmaceutical or a medical 
device on humans or animals (SOU 2017). Lindvall and Engström (2016) define clinical 
trials specifically in the context of pharmaceuticals as the study of the efficacy and safety 
of a pharmaceutical. For pharmaceuticals clinical trials are always required and, in some 
cases, they are required for medical devices. Knowledge about the benefits and risks of the 
pharmaceutical, or the device, is increased during the process, which is required before 
they are used in clinical practice (Asplund 2016).
According to Swedish law and regulation, medical research is defined as two types of 
activities. First, as systematic experimental or theoretical activities that have the aim of 
generating new knowledge. Second, as science-based development activities. Lindvall and 
Engström (2016) further define clinical research as research that involves patients, animals, 
or cell systems with the aim to generate scientific results useful for the development of new 
diagnostic methods or therapies that can solve a health problem, or identify factors that can 
improve health. Asplund (2016) does not provide an explicit definition of clinical research, 
but argues that when clinical research involves patients it becomes a mix of clinical practice 
and research. Both Lindvall and Engström (2016) and Asplund (2016) stress that the aim of 
clinical research involving patients is to generate new knowledge that can be applied to 
groups of patients as opposed to individual patients. Finally, Heckscher, Carlberg, and 
Gahmberg (2016) refer to translational research as research that aims to improve knowl-
edge flows between research and practice in order to increase patient benefits.
After analysing how activities related to clinical research are defined in different 
investigate reports we make the following observations. First, there is consensus that 
clinical practice based on confirmed experience is not considered a part of clinical 
research. Also, there is consensus that research involving human subjects at the hospital 
is clinical research. Second, the goals of what research should lead to are expressed in 
various ways. In some cases, the generation of new knowledge is expressed as a goal in 
itself, whereas in other cases the goal is expressed as to increase patient benefits or to 
develop new or improved treatments. Moreover, in some cases the goal is expressed as to 
provide scientific support for the efficacy of a certain treatment, e.g. use of a particular 
pharmaceutical. Third, we interpret that there is ambiguity around the regulation of 
activities that are variously referred to as the use of non-confirmed treatment, medical 
innovation or innovative therapies. In Table 2, they are in the top, right-hand quadrant. 
These are activities that professionals believe have played an important role for progress 
in medicine, and should be within the boundaries of clinical research, but are not 
explicitly acknowledged by Swedish law and regulation.
Turning to the regulatory changes suggested by the authors of the investigation 
reports to restore confidence and avoid similar crises in the future, we focus on those 
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directly related to clinical research in hospitals.1 Our interpretation is that the majority of 
the suggested changes are related to the use of innovative therapies in extreme cases with 
the aim to specify more clearly than before under which conditions innovative therapies 
may be used and what decision-making procedures are required. While the decision to 
consider the use of an innovative therapy as a treatment option is supposed to originate 
from physicians, and be supported by patients’ informed consent, the use of the therapy 
must also be supported by scientific knowledge and other medical professionals. 
Furthermore, the scientific rationale, along with evaluation of benefits and risks, needs 
to be documented and approved, first by clinical management and then by an external 
regulatory entity that specialises in reviewing applications for the use of innovative 
therapies. An exception is allowed if the health of the patient is likely to quickly 
deteriorate, in which case an application for review should be sent afterwards. Once an 
innovative therapy has been used for the first time, its further use is contingent upon the 
creation of a research study, subject to regulatory requirements of such a study.
The focus of the regulatory changes reported above on the use of innovative therapies 
reflects what the investigators identified as a major issue related to clinical research in 
hospitals, namely the justification for direct trials on human subjects. For each of the three 
patients, Macchiarini and his colleagues justified their decision to perform the surgery 
based on the ethics of clinical practice rather than the ethics of research. The investigators 
did not agree and their conclusion was based on the fact that Swedish law and regulation 
did not allow for the use of non-confirmed treatments as a part of clinical practice even in 
extreme cases, thus requiring ethical approval according to regulation concerning research 
on human subjects. The investigators did not propose any major change to the regulation of 
research on human subjects, because they – implicitly rather than explicitly – seemed to 
assume that the unintended negative consequences could have been avoided if the regula-
tion was correctly applied. The regulatory process would have discovered the weak 
scientific basis for the operations and not approved the operations until the scientific 
evidence was strong enough.2 However, most of the investigators, e.g. Lindvall and 
Engström (2016), SMER (2016) and SOU (2017), acknowledge that the use of non- 
confirmed treatments in extreme cases is a legitimate activity at the interface between 
medical research and clinical practice and should be accounted for in Swedish law and 
regulation. However, it should be subjected to external regulatory approval and not be 
applied more than once unless as a part of a research study.
5. Revisiting the conceptual framework
Having presented the case study of the crisis as three phases of stimulation, unintended 
consequences, and reaction and also analysed the reaction, we now return to the con-
ceptual framework presented in Section 2.
1Other suggestions for regulatory changes that are not directly related to clinical research activities in hospitals concern 
routines for recruitment of clinician-scientists, processes for handling allegations of scientific misconduct, documenta-
tion of research activities, delegation of authority, and clarity in responsibility of joint activities by universities and 
hospitals.
2This assumption can be questioned in hindsight as the authors of scientific publications of results from animal studies 
preceeding the operations have been found guilty of scientific misconduct by providing misleading presentation, 
interpretation and description of the results and failing to present raw data on which these results were based (see e.g. 
CERB (2016)).
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In the framework, we defined clinical research as the generation and use of new 
knowledge by clinician-scientists in the context of the hospital and involving 
patients. Furthermore, we conceptualised clinical research as an evolutionary pro-
blem-solving process, where the generation of variety is guided by theory-driven or 
experience-driven search, but where selection is done through direct trials, i.e. real- 
world settings involving patients. We defined innovation governance to include both 
the stimulation and regulation of clinical research activities. Furthermore, we 
expected that negative unintended consequences were not fully dealt with by existing 
regulation due to the tentative nature of innovation governance in the context of 
emerging science and technology.
Presenting the crisis as three phases has been useful for understanding the tentative 
nature of innovation governance and the challenges associated with the balancing of 
stimulation and regulation. Regenerative medicine is ‘a field of medicine devoted to 
treatments in which stem cells are induced to differentiate into the specific cell type 
required to repair damaged or destroyed cell populations or tissues’ (NIH 2015:23). One 
of the applications of regenerative medicine is the replacement of failed organs by 
artificial organs – as done by Macchiarini and his colleagues at the Karolinska 
University Hospital. In the last century a large body of scientific and technical knowledge 
was built about human organ transplants and such transplants are today performed as 
routine practice in many hospitals around the world. Regenerative medicine is an 
alternative to human transplants, but is yet to become a routine clinical practice. 
Instead, regenerative medicine is a fast-moving international field of research and 
innovation fuelled by large-scale funding (Coccia 2014; Salter and Faulkner 2011; 
Salter and Salter 2010). Thus, regenerative is a field where governments around the 
world – including the Swedish government – are stimulating research and innovation, 
while at the same time there are ambiguities in terms of how research and innovation 
should be regulated. We suggest that these ambiguities, in turn, generate negative 
unintended consequences and a reaction by the innovation governance system to restore 
confidence and avoid similar situations in the future. In this case study, the reaction is to 
specify more explicitly how clinical research is to be regulated and the role of external 
regulators. Their responses can be interpreted in two ways. It can be interpreted as 
stricter regulation because it extends the role of external regulators, but it can also be 
interpreted as a way to legitimise activities that are considered important means for 
technological innovation.
We find that the ambiguities in the regulation of clinical research are not evenly 
distributed among the activities that constitute clinical research. To elucidate these 
differences, we propose that clinical research is divided into three types of activities 
(Figure 3):
(1) Search for new knowledge aims to increase our basic understanding of life and 
diseases without necessarily searching for new treatment options. This activity is 
primarily theory-driven, i.e. informed by science, and the innovation governance 
actors agreed it should be regulated as research activity.
(2) Search for new solutions aims to increase patients’ benefits or develop new or 
improved treatments. This activity is primarily experience-driven, i.e. informed by 
practice, but many of the innovation governance actors argued that the regulation 
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of these activities is not clear, e.g. how decisions are made about the use of 
innovative therapies in extreme cases.
(3) Support for new solutions aims to test and compare the efficacy of particular 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, or treatment procedures. This activity is primarily 
theory-driven and the innovation governance actors agreed that this activity is 
either regulated as research or by specific regulation concerning clinical trials.
Our proposed division of clinical research into search for new knowledge, search for new 
solutions, and support for new solutions, highlights the difference between experience- 
driven and theory-driven search activities. While there is a high degree of consensus 
about the regulation of search for new knowledge and support for new solutions, which 
are primarily theory-driven activities, we found less consensus about the regulation of the 
search for new solutions, which is primarily experience-driven. Most innovation govern-
ance actors agree that the regulation does not clearly specify if, and under what condi-
tions search for new solutions may be applied, even if clinician-scientists seem to agree 
about the importance of such activities for (past) progress in medicine (Ahrens 1992; 
Asplund 2016; Hirsch 1997). This ambiguity seems to have normalised action within the 
medical profession, either intentionally or unintentionally, that appeared to outsiders as 
deviant (Hedgecoe 2013). This likely creates the unintended consequences that generated 
the public outcry. In response, the regulation of clinical research was adjusted, in this case 
study, by more clearly specifying under what conditions search for new solutions may be 
used and how the decisions to use them are reviewed by actors in the innovation 
governance system.
6. Conclusions and future research
The purpose of this article is to better understand the challenges involved in avoiding the 
dark side of technological innovation processes. Using a longitudinal case study of 
medical innovation, we have explored how actors in the innovation governance system 
counterbalance the stimulation of novelty for future benefits for society with the regula-
tion of novelty, in order to avoid the risk of unintended consequences. We analysed how 
actors in the respective innovation governance system reacted to negative unintended 
consequences; a reaction that we interpret as an attempt to restore the balance between 
the stimulation and regulation of technological innovation processes by clarifying ambi-
guities in the regulation at interface between research and practice.
Our first set of conclusions is concerned with the impacts of the ambiguities in the 
regulation of the interface between research and practice. We propose to conceptualise 
these ambiguities as grey zones. We define grey zones as situations when it is unclear if the 
benefits of experimentation – direct trials – outweigh its risks. We argue that grey zones are 
connected to the activities at the interface between research and practice, and specifically 
those we conceptualise as search for new solutions. Search for new solutions is charac-
terised by experimentation in real-world settings which may include humans as well as 
socio-technical systems whose continuous operation is important for human well-being. 
The mere possibility of serious harm creates ambiguity about the level of risk analysis, and 
the scope of the expected benefits, that are needed in advance to justify the search. This 
ambiguity is further amplified by the different perspectives of research and practice when it 
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comes to the beneficiaries and risk takers in the context of a new practice. For practice, the 
focus is on the benefits and risks of single constituents, while for research the benefits tend 
to be more general for the same level of risk. For example, from the perspective of clinical 
practice, the unique situation of each patient – due to anatomical variations, condition of 
the disease, or available methods and resources for treatment – needs to be considered 
when selecting treatment options. If the benefits outweigh the risks for the individual 
patient, then deviations from standard practice, such as doses of approved pharmaceuticals, 
use of approved pharmaceutical for different indications than originally intended, and new 
uses of approved medical devices, are accepted (Schwartz 2014). From the perspective of 
medical research – where the objective is to search for generalised knowledge – the benefits 
are much larger for the same level of risk as the beneficiaries also include all future patients 
that would benefit from the new practice.
Moreover, we propose that grey zones are continually created and resolved over time, 
as innovation governance systems counterbalance innovation and the risk of negative 
unintended consequences. We argue that the main reason for the continual existence of 
grey zones is the inherent uncertainty of technological innovation, as generated through 
an inherently uncertain process of problem solving (Consoli et al. 2016; Kline and 
Rosenberg 1986; Thomke, von Hippel, and Franke 1998; Vincenti 1990). When 
a particular class of problems emerges (e.g. cancer) different classes of solutions are 
developed to solve them (e.g. surgery, radiation therapy, and chemical therapy). Search at 
the interface between research and practice generates new scientific and technological 
knowledge related to the nature of the problem and the efficacy of the different sets of 
solutions. This includes knowledge about the benefits and risks of applying a particular 
class of solutions to a particular class of problems, which will reduce grey zones. 
However, new classes of problems will always emerge as well as new classes of solutions 
that can be applied to both new and existing classes of problems. For these new classes of 
solutions there may be great expectations about their potential benefits, but – at least to 
begin with – limited knowledge about how these benefits are realised. Furthermore, there 
will also be incomplete knowledge about the risks that need to be taken to develop the 
knowledge and artefacts for consistent and reliable use of the solutions in practice and the 
risks of repeated use. Thus, inherent uncertainty about future problems and solutions 
means that, even if some grey zones are resolved, new ones will emerge along with 
emerging science and technology.
Our second set of conclusions is for medical innovation specifically. There have been 
longstanding debates in medicine about the relative effectiveness of different means for 
generating and selecting new clinical practices. Already in the early 20th century, when the 
Rockefeller Institute of Medical Research and the associated Rockefeller Hospital were 
established, physicians debated whether ideas generated by scientists at the laboratories of 
the Institute should be tested by physicians at the hospital or if physicians working at the 
hospital should generate ideas through observing and measuring patients at the bedside 
followed by investigations in the laboratories before being confirmed by application in the 
hospital (Hirsch 1997). Recently, observers including Gittelman (2016), have associated the 
progress in 20th century medicine to the experience-driven, approach and the current 
slowdown of progress to the dominance of a theory-driven approach to innovation. We 
believe that our conceptual model and interpretations from our case study provide an 
opportunity to bring a more nuanced perspective to this debate.
96 M. MCKELVEY AND R. J. SAEMUNDSSON
In contrast to the arguments about a shift in beliefs about the relative effectiveness of 
the two approaches put forth by Gittelman (2016), we propose that the current promi-
nence of theory-driven approach to medical research and innovation may be better 
explained by the role of the innovation governance system in shaping the means available 
for generating and applying new knowledge at the intersection between medical research 
and clinical practice. Even if experience-driven activities were more effective in generat-
ing and selecting among ideas of new clinical practices, their effectiveness is counter-
balanced by their potential for negative unintended consequences. When unintended 
consequences emerge, they will lead to reactions by actors in the innovation governance 
system, which may subsequently make experience-based activities less available as means 
for generating and applying new knowledge due to more stringent external regulation. 
An interesting opportunity for further research is to test this proposition by empirically 
studying changes in innovation governance of medical innovation in selected fields as 
multiple phases of stimulation, negative unintended consequence, and reaction.
Our final set of conclusions relate to the more general debate about the intersection 
and relationships between scientific research and technological innovation, and, hence, 
the relationship between theory-driven search and experience-driven search. 
Nightingale (2004) argues that it is difficult, and often impossible, to accurately predict 
complex phenomena from first principles, even if they may be predicted through 
experience of empirical regularities. Thus, it is difficult, and often impossible, to 
develop new practice without experience-driven search and direct trials, even if the 
new practice is inspired and guided by scientific research. At the same time, the 
increasing power of predictive science (Arora and Gambardella 1994; Fleming and 
Sorenson 2004) suggests that the importance of theory-driven indirect trials for tech-
nological innovation is increasing reducing the need for experience-driven direct trials. 
We propose that the continual ambiguity around searches for new solutions at the 
interface between research and practice – primarily an experience-driven activity using 
direct trials – provides pressure for using indirect trials, such as computer simulation, 
because there will be less risk for negative unintended consequences. These pressures 
will be stronger in times of crisis and in those real-world settings where the risks of 
unintended consequences are higher.
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